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International  efforts  to  increase  the  quality  and  effi-
ciency of health care services may be creating financial 
savings that can be used to improve population health. 
This  article  examines  evidence  that  such  savings  (ie,  a 
quality/efficiency or value dividend) are accruing and how 
they have been allocated and assesses the prospects for 
reallocating future savings to improve population health. 
Savings have resulted mainly from reducing the number 
of inappropriate or harmful interventions, managing care 
of people with chronic disease more effectively, and imple-
menting health information technology. Savings to date 
have accrued to the revenues of public and private collec-
tive purchasers of care and large provider organizations, 
but none seem to have been reallocated to address other 
determinants  of  health.  Furthermore,  improved  quality 
sometimes increases spending.
Introduction
The  rapid  growth  of  an  international  movement  to 
improve the quality (including the safety) and efficiency of 
health care services has led to speculation about whether 
any resulting savings can be used to improve population 
health. This article explores the limited evidence about 
whether  improvements  in  the  quality  and  efficiency  of 
health care services yield net savings (ie, a quality/effi-
ciency or value dividend) and scantier evidence about how 
savings to date have been allocated.
The  possibility  that  a  portion  of  any  dividend  from 
improving the quality and efficiency of health care services 
can be used to address other determinants of health has 
recently attracted interest in several industrial countries 
that  provide  universal  coverage.  A  select  committee  of 
the  British  Parliament  recommended  in  2007  that  the 
National  Institute  of  Health  and  Clinical  Excellence 
(NICE) offer more guidance about what health services 
to  “disinvest”  from  and  how  to  reinvest  the  savings  in 
clinical and community health interventions. Australian 
researchers recently proposed criteria for disinvestment 
and reinvestment by government health agencies and doc-
umented support for such a program among policy makers 
(1). Donald Berwick, an American who is an international 
leader  in  quality  improvement,  argues  on  the  basis  of 
international experience that it is feasible to achieve the 
“triple aim” of “improving the experience of care, improv-
ing  the  health  of  populations,  and  reducing  per  capita 
costs of health care” (2).
Searching for a Quality/Efficiency Dividend 
in the United States
The  search  for  a  dividend  as  a  result  of  improving 
the  quality  (including  safety)  and  efficiency  of  health 
care  services  in  the  United  States  began  in  the  1980s. 
Expenditures for health care had been increasing for sev-
eral decades at a rate higher than general inflation. By 
the end of the 1970s, most policy makers for health care 
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had concluded that any expansion of access would require 
slowing the rate of increase in spending.
The  recession  of  the  early  1980s  exacerbated  concern 
among  employers  and  union  leaders  that  the  interna-
tional competitiveness of American industry was declin-
ing  for  reasons  that  included  employment-based  health 
care coverage. To address this decline in competitiveness, 
American corporations reimported from Japan techniques 
of scientific management that had originated in the United 
States  earlier  in  the  century.  Business  leaders  applied 
these techniques to all aspects of their business, including 
spending for health services.
Executives  and  physician  leaders  of  large  health  pro-
vider  systems  also  accorded  considerable  attention  to 
what  would  soon  be  called  quality  improvement  science. 
Managers of hospitals and health systems had begun in the 
1970s to identify with private sector executives rather than 
with their predecessors, for whom careers in health care 
were extensions of philanthropic service or public admin-
istration. These managers were particularly aware of the 
increasing number of their patients who were covered by 
the self-insured benefit plans of large firms that engaged 
in formal quality improvement. As a result of incentives 
in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), more than half of workers and their dependents 
were enrolled in these plans by the late 1980s.
Policy makers for health care in the federal government 
joined  the  quality  improvement  movement  during  the 
Reagan administration, when the Health Care Financing 
Administration  (HCFA,  now  the  Centers  for  Medicare 
and Medicaid Services) imposed prospective payment for 
Medicare Part A (hospital) benefits. Disease related groups 
(DRGs), the regulatory tool for prospective payment, had 
been devised to improve efficiency and quality by measur-
ing how hospitals used resources. The co-investigator for 
the research project that conceptualized DRGs, John D. 
Thompson, was strongly influenced by analytical methods 
to improve quality and efficiency in hospitals that Florence 
Nightingale had devised in the 1850s and 1860s (3). As a 
result, DRGs had a dual purpose from their introduction 
into policy: to contain the growth of public spending and to 
create incentives to reduce the average length of hospital 
stays and the overuse of ancillary services.
HCFA  addressed  quality  more  explicitly  during  the 
second Reagan administration. In 1986 it began a contro-
versial project that compared, and published, death rates 
among hospitals. A year later the administrator of HCFA, 
William Roper, was lead author of an article in the New 
England Journal of Medicine that advocated measuring 
the  effectiveness  of  health  services  to  pay,  eventually, 
for  what  worked.  In  response  to  the  Omnibus  Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1987, HCFA and external research-
ers, led by John Morris, devised what became the mini-
mum data set for measuring and reporting the quality of 
care in residential nursing facilities.
Beginning in the late 1980s, states used their authority 
to regulate health plans and facilities to encourage trans-
parency about outcomes and quality. Public agencies in 
New York and Pennsylvania, for example, compared death 
rates  of  hospital  patients  who  had  cardiac  surgery.  In 
California, a new public agency collected information from 
hospitals,  including  data  about  outcomes.  Many  states 
required health plans to make public the data they had 
reported to the National Committee on Quality Assurance, 
a nonprofit organization.
The measurement of quality in clinical practice and the 
dissemination of techniques to improve it accelerated dur-
ing the 1990s. The Institute for Healthcare Improvement 
trained, advised, and inspired many health care profes-
sionals  and  leaders  of  provider  systems.  Managed  care 
plans used evidence about quality to select clinicians and 
hospitals for their networks. They used the controversial 
methods of managed care to control costs by increasing 
efficiency as well as by curtailing use.
In  parallel  with  the  quality  improvement  movement, 
researchers were collaborating internationally to improve 
methods  for  evaluating  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency 
of health care technology and care processes. Systematic 
reviews  were  a  powerful  tool  for  identifying  bias  in 
research about interventions and then pooling data from 
multiple  studies  to  increase  statistical  power.  Eighty-
seven  systematic  reviews  appeared  in  the  international 
literature in 1988, the year before publication of the first 
set of reviews evaluating an entire field of care. During 
the next 2 decades the number of new and updated sys-
tematic reviews published each year grew to more than 
2,500. Moreover, by the first decade of the 21st century an 
increasing number of reviews were comparing the effec-
tiveness  of  competing  interventions.  During  the  same 
years, advances in methods of improving health services 
occurred in the disciplines of economics and decision sci-VOLUME 7: NO. 5
SEPTEMBER 2010
  www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2010/sep/10_0028.htm • Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
The opinions expressed by authors contributing to this journal do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the US Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Public Health Service, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or the authors’ affiliated institutions. Use of trade names is for identification only and 
does not imply endorsement by any of the groups named above.
ence. Perhaps most important, the evolving methods of 
analyzing  cost-effectiveness  yielded  more  precise  esti-
mates of relative value for money.
Insurance plans and public agencies increasingly used 
findings from research on effectiveness and efficiency to 
inform  decisions  about  coverage.  The  Blue  Cross/Blue 
Shield  Association  created  a  program  to  assess  health 
technology in 1985, building on work it began in the 1970s. 
Other organizations, commercial and nonprofit, provided 
technology assessment to provider organizations by sub-
scription. A new international organization, the Cochrane 
Collaboration, set standards for, produced, and published 
systematic  reviews.  The  federal  Agency  for  Healthcare 
Research and Quality (under an earlier name) began in 
1997 to commission research evaluating the effectiveness 
of interventions from organizations it designated evidence-
based practice centers (4).
A committee of the Institute of Medicine shocked the 
health sector and the media in 2000 when it estimated 
that  80,000  to  100,000  unnecessary  deaths  occurred  in 
hospitals  each  year.  A  year  later,  the  committee  pub-
lished recommendations for “crossing the quality chasm,” 
revealed by these deaths and other evidence of inadequate 
care (5).
By  the  turn  of  the  new  century,  the  rapidly  evolving 
methods for measuring and improving quality and evalu-
ating  the  effectiveness  and  comparative  effectiveness  of 
interventions were informing policy and practice in the 
United  States  and  other  industrial  countries.  The  chief 
medical officers of integrated delivery systems and many 
other  large  provider  organizations  urged  greater  use  of 
what was commonly (if controversially) called evidence-
based health research in clinical decisions. The Veterans 
Health  Administration  had,  since  1993,  begun  to  make 
significant  and  widely  publicized  improvement  in  qual-
ity under the leadership of Ken Kizer. Berwick and the 
Institute  for  Healthcare  Improvement  stimulated  and 
documented quality improvement as a result of “learning 
collaboratives” of physicians and hospital staff (6).
In  2001,  states  began  to  use  evidence  of  comparative 
effectiveness  to  establish  formularies,  called  preferred 
drug lists (PDLs), for Medicaid and other public programs. 
Three states began collaborating in 2003 to commission, 
finance, and make publicly accessible systematic reviews 
of drugs in particular classes. The number of collabora-
tors had grown to 17 by 2009 and included a Canadian 
intergovernmental agency. Forty-five states had PDLs in 
2009.  Evidence  accumulated  that  research-based  PDLs 
improved quality and controlled the growth of cost (7).
But much evidence of the effect of other quality improve-
ment activities on expenditures was inconclusive. In the 
1990s,  most  practitioners  of  quality  improvement  and 
evidence-based health research prioritized improving out-
comes over cost savings. Nevertheless, in 1998 Shortell 
and colleagues cited several reports of savings as a result 
of continuous quality improvement. Intermountain Health 
Care, for example, reported $30 million of annual savings 
from “60 ongoing clinical improvement initiatives.” Most 
of  the  studies  the  authors  located,  however,  assessed 
evidence  from  a  single  site  and  used  “relatively  weak” 
designs, primarily “before-and-after observations” (8).
Five years later, in an article that has been cited fre-
quently, Sheila Leatherman and colleagues asked whether 
“improving  health  care  quality  cost  money  or  save[d] 
money.” The authors concluded that “even where analyses 
do exist, the answer varies with the stakeholder’s view-
point and the time frame examined” (9).
Subsequent research, especially in the United Kingdom, 
documented  that  improving  quality  sometimes  led  to 
improved outcomes and fewer adverse events but at addi-
tional  cost  (10).  The  chairman  of  NICE  emphasized  in 
2009, for example, that “in practice [NICE guidelines] tend 
to add to the cost of providing care” (11).
The Current Search for Savings
Little evidence shows that improving quality and effi-
ciency  in  clinical  settings  yields  savings  that  are  large 
and  sufficiently  identifiable  to  be  reallocated.  In  2003 
Leatherman and colleagues described 3 perspectives for 
linking quality and cost: business, economic, and social (9). 
Under their definition, a business case for savings would 
be made if providers realize a return on their investment 
in a reorganized care process in a “reasonable time frame.” 
An  economic  case  would  be  persuasive  if  “discounted 
financial benefits exceed discounted costs, whether they 
accrue  to  patients,  employers,  providers  or  payers.”  A 
social case would be evidence of any “benefit to the indi-
vidual (patient) or to society of improved health status and 
productivity, regardless of cost.”VOLUME 7: NO. 5
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Leatherman  and  other  colleagues  subsequently  docu-
mented the weakness of the business case for quality and 
efficiency. In 2005 they reviewed and summarized articles 
in the American literature that contained sufficient data 
to  calculate  a  return  on  investment  to  providers.  They 
found only 15 articles that met their inclusion criteria and 
concluded that “scant attention is currently paid in the 
quality-of-care literature to the cost of implementing qual-
ity-enhancing interventions” (12).
In  2008  Leatherman,  again  with  other  colleagues, 
reported  on  a  “demonstration  project  designed  to  mea-
sure the business case for selected quality interventions 
in high-risk high-cost populations in Medicaid managed 
care organizations.” They concluded that savings would 
result mainly from interventions “that have potential for 
short-term  return  on  investment  and  primarily  seek  to 
reduce avoidable emergency room and inpatient hospital 
utilization.”  They  warned,  however,  that  managed  care 
organizations would be wary of quality improvement that 
achieved savings because Medicaid agencies might reduce 
capitation rates as costs declined (13).
In  contrast,  the  Center  for  Health  Care  Strategies 
(CHCS)  argues  that  the  interests  of  Medicaid  agencies 
and managed care organizations can be aligned. CHCS 
has devised and, in collaboration with the Commonwealth 
Fund, is promoting tools with which state Medicaid pro-
grams  can  conduct  “return  on  investment  analysis”  to 
“lower costs without sacrificing quality of care or enroll-
ment capacity” (14).
Elliott  Fisher  and  colleagues  recommend  policy  to 
achieve  savings  linked  to  quality  improvement  on  the 
basis  of  their  research  at  Dartmouth  on  unwarranted 
regional variation in the use of health care. Their studies 
have documented “marked regional differences in spend-
ing [for Medicare] . . . after careful adjustment for health.” 
Because integrated delivery systems “offer great promise 
for improving quality and lowering costs,” Medicare policy 
should foster “local organizations’ accountability for qual-
ity  and  costs  through  performance  measurement  and 
shared savings payment reform.” The savings would be 
shared among physicians and health systems. This pro-
posal has attracted considerable attention in the media 
and among policy makers because Fisher and colleagues 
estimate that approximately 30% of Medicare spending is 
unnecessary (15).
Researchers at the RAND Corporation reached a simi-
lar conclusion, using different methods. A RAND report 
of 2005, still quoted by the media in 2009, estimated that 
substantial savings would result from improved quality 
and efficiency. RAND researchers estimated that if 90% 
of  hospitals  and  physicians  adopted  health  information 
technology, the combined savings from improved health, 
safety, and efficiency would during the next 15 years total 
approximately 6% of 2009 spending for health care.
Other researchers are less optimistic about potential sav-
ings from avoiding the overuse, misuse, or inappropriate 
use of care. Bentley and colleagues, for example, devised 
a  “typology  of  operational  waste,”  which  they  define  as 
duplication of services, inefficient processes, overly expen-
sive inputs, and “quality defects that result in rework or 
scrapping.” They found that such waste amounted only to 
1.9% to 3.4% of US health care spending in 2006. They also 
found it difficult to “identify clinical procedures that are 
unambiguously wasteful” (16).
Other  recent  studies  found  only  limited  savings  as  a 
result of improving the coordination of care (17). A 2007 
study of countries that are members of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development described evi-
dence of “cost efficiency” as a result of better coordination 
as “inconclusive” (18). A review of 15 randomized trials of 
the effects of care coordination on hospitalization, quality 
of care, and health expenditures among Medicare benefi-
ciaries concluded that, “Coordination programs without a 
strong transitional care component are unlikely to yield 
net Medicare savings” (19).
Some experts emphasize political and cultural barriers 
to accruing savings by reducing the volume of ineffective 
care. Bryan and Graeme Haynes, for example, listed many 
interventions (eg, use of antioxidants for the prevention 
of cancer and cardiovascular disease) that are still used 
although persuasive research has demonstrated that they 
offer no benefits or can be harmful. Then they describe 
how “vested interests” work to “make us forget that the 
justification for their promotion has been gored” (20).
Anecdotal  evidence,  however,  continues  to  encourage 
optimism about generating a value dividend, despite the 
discouraging  research  findings  I  have  surveyed.  Large 
provider organizations, for example, report savings as a 
result of quality improvement in particular service lines. 
Examples include Ascension Health, the Geisinger Health VOLUME 7: NO. 5
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System,  Sutter  Health,  and  Kaiser  Permanente.  Many 
experts on quality improvement claim that the Swedish 
county of Jönköping is achieving the lowest per capita costs 
and highest quality among jurisdictions in that country.
Conclusion
Both research and anecdotes support the generalization 
that any dividend that has accrued to date has reduced 
costs mainly for public purchasers, health plans, and pro-
vider organizations. Moreover, such savings have improved 
the general revenue of these organizations instead of hav-
ing been reallocated for particular purposes.
There is persuasive evidence, for instance, that many 
American  states  are  achieving  substantial  savings  in 
spending  for  pharmaceutical  drugs  in  public  programs 
by  using  PDLs  that  rely  on  systematic  reviews.  These 
savings  offset  other  expenditures  for  Medicaid  and  the 
health benefits of public employees (7). The state of North 
Carolina is an exception. Under its Community Care pro-
gram, in statewide operation since 2005, case managers 
and  physicians  collaborate  to  “improve  and  coordinate 
care  across  1,200  medical  practices  serving  more  than 
884,000 Medicaid recipients.” The state allocates savings 
achieved by the program to hiring additional staff for the 
14 regional networks that administer it (21).
Even in countries with universal coverage and strong 
commitment to addressing broad determinants of popula-
tion health, savings from improving value accrue mainly 
to general revenue. A senior official in Jönköping, reply-
ing to my question about the allocation of savings that he 
estimated to be 2% of the county’s health expenditures, 
wrote: “Our savings go directly to pensions, investments 
and improvement work, so they are hard to put the finger 
on  as  1  single  thing”  (personal  communication,  2009). 
Similarly, there is no evidence that savings in Britain, 
as a result of the implementation of findings from stud-
ies conducted by NICE, have been allocated for purposes 
other than health care.
A  recent  study  explored  the  feasibility  of  reallocating 
resources  from  health  care  in  Amsterdam  to  “sustained 
population-wide health improvement.” The authors found 
that the “municipality held a public health perspective but 
did not use it to really govern the health system.” The sick-
ness fund with the largest market share “had no interest in 
targeting healthcare to the needs of the Amsterdam popula-
tion.” An executive of the fund said that “[w]e do not repre-
sent public interests! We represent our customers.” After 
reviewing relevant literature in the context of their findings, 
the  authors  concluded  that,  “Population  health  consider-
ations are not central to European health reforms” (22).
Two economists claim that research in their discipline that 
purports to inform policy makers about how to create value 
dividends has, perversely, caused spending to increase. The 
standard method for economic evaluation of health services, 
Birch and Gafni argue, leads to “an increase in health care 
expenditures” rather than to savings as a result of flaws 
in the standard method for calculating “incremental cost-
effectiveness ratios” (ICERs). They propose that, instead of 
calculating ICERS, purchasing organizations pay for new 
technologies only when their “adoption leads to an unam-
biguous increase in health gains from available resources.” 
However,  the  method  they  recommend  for  estimating 
health gains assumes that policy makers would ration care 
(by ceilings on resources) and would disinvest from tech-
nologies that do not improve health (23).
Other  experts  doubt  that  improving  overall  popula-
tion health would have the highest priority when a value 
dividend is reallocated. “Societal goals,” Bentley and col-
leagues write, “override basic cost-effectiveness analysis 
considerations  of  cost  and  value.”  For  example,  “as  a 
society we may prefer to provide care to the sickest, most 
vulnerable  patients,  even  though  our  money  could  buy 
greater improvements in life span or quality of life if used 
for another purpose” (16). Policy makers are likely, that is, 
to ration spending to improve overall population health to 
avoid rationing health care.
Many people steeped in American health politics would 
likely agree. Any future savings from improving the qual-
ity and efficiency of health care in the United States would 
most likely be allocated to expanding access (best case) or 
to  slowing  the  inexorable  growth  of  spending  (probable 
case). Like the illusory Cold War or peace dividend that 
was reinvested in hot wars and homeland security, any 
dividend from health care could also finance responses to 
unanticipated epidemics and disasters.
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